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In January 2011, German science policy advisers at federal level, the 2008
appointed German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, produced a cautious
but positive review of pre-implantation genetic screening (http://www.leopoldina.
org/en/policy-advice/recommendations-and-statements/national-recommendations/
praeimplantationsdiagnostik-pid.html - accessed 21 April, 2011). Immediately, the
advice was attacked as an example of politics-contaminated, instead of value-free
science. But simultaneously, many seasoned science policy advisers came to the
rescue and defended an advice that clearly spoke to the present political debate; and
thus also addressed normative and pragmatic issues. The response to keep science
‘value-free’ is the typical tradition of science politics under high modernity in a
political system of representative democracy. Scientiﬁc experts are seen as ‘dele-
gates’ of citizens’ best judgment on the issue; and the delegation occurs under
public accountability of elected legislative bodies or an executive accountable to
such bodies. But at present, democratization of expertise, public engagement or
direct public participation in science is the more popular and dominant response.
This is partly rooted in social and political theories arguing a shift from government
to governance. If the state is unable to represent all public concerns and questions
involving the uses of science and technology of a fragmented and inchoate ‘pro-
topublic’ (Dewey), more directly participatory and deliberative routes for
(individual) citizen inﬂuence become attractive. Therefore, an unlikely alliance of
egalitarian STS scholars, radical analysts of science, democratic theorists, and
promoters of science-driven industrial innovation and some state bureaucrats have
come to effectively promote more public engagement and participation in science
(Caswill 2010; Wesselink and Hoppe 2011). In a sentence: science is to become
more democratic, and democracy more scientiﬁc (In ‘t Veld 2010).
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DOI 10.1007/s11024-011-9179-xIn Science in Democracy Brown takes a broad and hard look at the relationship
between politics and science in democratic theory and, to a lesser extent, practice.
Contrary to the dominant participatory frame, he scrutinizes this relationship
through the lens of ‘representation’ as a conceptual walking bridge between politics
and science: ‘‘Representative democracy is not merely an expedient for coping with
the size and complexity of modern states. …Just as scientiﬁc representations of
nature are mediated by several social practices and laboratory instruments, political
representation involves more than a simple transmission or ‘making present’ of
constituent ideas, interests and identities’’ (xi-xii).
Science in Democracy purports to demonstrate the shortcomings of both
‘‘common responses to the politicization of science – expelling politics from
science; advocating the democratization of expertise and public engagement – as
relying both on mistaken ‘correspondence views of representation’, namely, for the
technocrats (scientists, rh): the impossibility of science as ‘‘mirror of nature’’, and
for the moralists (politicians and policymakers, rh) the impossibility of participatory
or deliberative politics as ‘‘mirror of the people’s will/interest or common sense’’
(17-18). Brown sets out to develop ‘‘an alternative account of both scientiﬁc and
political representation as practices of mediation that transform what they
represent’’ (viii). Key statement here is that representation requires work, and this
always involves uncertainty and transformation of the represented. (R)epresentation
shapes both the represented and the representer: scientists transform non-human
entities through laboratory work in reliable information or facts; politicians
transform the many different, enraged or stiﬂed voices of their constituents into a
single voice (177-8).
Brown’s concentration on ‘representation’ is an important and welcome
contribution as not many STS and political science scholars pay sufﬁcient attention
to the political institutional landscape of representative democracy when discussing
citizen participation and/in the science/politic nexus (cf. Hoppe 2010a, b; Caswill
2010); post-normal science being one good illustration of the tendency (Wesselink
and Hoppe 2011). However, rather than presenting a clear-cut theory, Brown offers
a series of preliminary conceptual meditations, ‘prolegomena’, of the science-
democracy nexus. This results from Brown’s inspiration by and, in a way, even
‘imitation’ of Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) classical political science treatise on
‘representation’. She analyzed concepts of representation as used by political
thinkers like Hobbes, Burke, Mill and Bentham; and tried to connect them to more
everyday political usage in the 20th century. Brown’s basic idea is to compare
Pitkin’s ﬁndings on political representation with traditional thinking on scientiﬁc
‘representation’. After all, both politics and science deal with representations – one
of ‘people’, the other of ‘nature’. So, Brown basically re-reads and interprets
classical political philosophers and modern democratic theory through an STS-lens.
Using STS-theory, he shows how particular ideas and key notions about
representation in science also lie ‘hidden’ in classical and modern political thought.
Only in the ﬁnal three chapters, on how science becomes political, elements of
democratic representation and institutionalizing democratic representation in
science politics, Brown comes on his own as theoretician of political democracy
and the sociology of science, technology and society (STS). In essence, Brown
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representation:
– as authorization, procedurally of ofﬁce holders, substantively as experts;
– as accountability, as ex post counterpart to authorization;
– as participation, as venue of active engagement between citizens and
representatives;
– as deliberation, as ﬁtting the cognitive side of democracy and knowledge-based,
speech-based, decentered forums and debates on ‘good governance’;
– as resemblance, or a certain kind of (statistical) likeness or similarity between
constituents and their representatives.
The distribution of these ﬁve dimensions of representation over institutions and
venues in an entire political regime constitutes the ‘level of representative
democracy’ of that regime; and so also determines how science is represented in the
political arena. All this Brown argues on a very conceptual level, with sparse, but
well-chosen real-life examples; so his theory remains rather much a formal
framework to be ﬁlled in with empirical detail (and thereby tested on validity and
usefulness) only later.
Limitations of space preclude an exhaustive treatment of Brown’s theory of
science-democracy relationships. Here only two salient aspects are mentioned.
Brown sees three possibilities of how societies may respond to the politics of
science:
– displacement: e.g. liberals displace the politics of science and technology
frequently to market mechanisms – e.g. public-private partnerships in genomics
and life sciences (Bijker et al. 2009). Unfortunately, Brown hardly treats this
issue any further in his book. If he had, he might have been more able to
forcefully speak to the tribe of STI scholars and analysts as preachers of the
innovation gospel; and, at the same time, to speak more positively about the
political necessity of hybrid forum to correct for the overﬂows/ externalities of a
basically contractual society (Callon et al. 2009).
– suppression: avoid or stiﬂe dissemination of scientiﬁc knowledge to a wider
audience when it conﬂicts with a group’s interests or strong convictions (e.g.
evolution theory, gender relations in Islam, or causal connections between
smoking and cancer)
– institutionalization: this is what Brown (following Machiavelli, Dewey and
Latour) advocates in this book.
Before discussing the how and what of institutionalization, Brown professes his
belief in representative democracy as the best form of democracy (193). Following
Pitkin’s lead, instead of arguing that deliberative and participatory forms of
democracy may (or ought to) complement representative democracy, he chooses to
‘stretch’ the concept of ‘representation’ to include practices and procedures of
democracy that other authors would classify as ‘participatory’ or ‘deliberative’.
From this position, Brown warns that, by treating politicians and politics as just on
other ‘‘stakeholder’’ and ‘‘interest’’ among many, STS-scholars overstress the
symmetry principle; thereby unnecessarily and un-empirically(!) ﬂattening the
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have a distinctive role in shaping science and technology.
1. science and politics have different centers of institutional gravity: science is an
institutional space where mistakes are tolerated; politicians are held much more
accountable for their mistakes (193-4);
2. science and politics have different ‘timescapes’: science is slow and technology
builds on the past; politics has to take into account present needs and desires of
constituents (194) and is under constant pressure to decide (195);
3. in spite of much talk about non-state politics and network governance and
issue- or technology-based (Feenberg, xxx) rather the territorial constituencies,
the state (having resources available like the legitimate use of force, taxation,
legislation) remains the center of institutional gravity for equal power, equal
human rights and intergovernmental (EU) and global governance regimes (like
IMF, WTO, WHO, IFCC, CITES, etc.) (195-6).
4. politics generates an institutional and legal context for science; a political
framework for science – and not vice versa.
Concluding and summarizing, Brown argues that instead of hiding between
science or politics, and thereby ‘politicizing’ science or ‘scientizing/depoliticizing
politics’, a better response is to embed scientiﬁc representation in a framework of
political representation. (259) In order to realize this, the ﬁve dimensions of
representation require different types of institutions (parliaments, bureaucracies,
deliberative – hybrid – forums, interest groups, etc.) to facilitate them. ‘‘The degree
to which citizens enjoy democratic representation…should be judged with respect to
the ecology of institutions to which they have access, rather than with respect to any
single institution. …’’ (237). ‘‘Not all institutions need to represent their constituents
in the same way, … What is important is that citizens in a representative democracy
have access to diverse modes of representation, such that their respective attributes
(= authorization, accountability, participation, deliberation and resemblance)
balance each other out’’ (255). E.g., deliberative forums (consensus conferences,
citizen juries) are strong in resemblance; but they are weak in authorization and
accountability; elected representatives are strong in exactly these two dimensions;
interest groups are strong in non-deliberative mobilization and participation but
weak in reﬂection.
Finally, a word on the strengths and weaknesses of Brown’s book. No doubt,
bringing STS and political philosophy together is its greatest strength. Doing so by
using the concept of ‘representation’ as a walking bridge is innovative and
politically relevant for STS-scholars who have too uncritically embraced models of
participatory democracy and civic engagement as remedy for expertocratic science
and STI policy. For political scientists, looking at politics through an STS-lens has
the beneﬁt of bringing into sharp focus the problem of representing ‘protopublics’
(Dewey) or ‘reassembling the social’ (Latour) under modern conditions. In addition,
STS may teach political scientists to no longer view scientiﬁc inputs in politics and
policymaking as a sort of ‘deus ex machina’, but as the outcome of empirically
researchable civic epistemologies. The concept of ‘civic epistemology’ is
potentially much richer than standard political and policy science views of the
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policy, knowledge utilization and information asymmetries in rational choice
theories.
This said, it is a pity that Brown limits himself to political philosophy and
conceptual work in STS. In this way, he overlooks modern empirical work in
political science on citizenship and modern forms of political participation (Bang
2003; Dalton 2008). Regarding advisory bodies and the elite-initiated character of
many participatory and civic engagement exercises, he misses opportunities to
empirically ﬂesh out their embeddedness in bureaucratic politics and public
policymaking processes (Hoppe 2010a, b) and their typical ways of knowledge
utilization or boundary work arrangements and conﬁgurations (Weiss 1999; Nutley
et al. 2007; Halffman 2003; Hoppe 2005). Most importantly, the idea to apply all
dimensions of representation to all the venues of a political system to determine its
‘representative quality’ for citizens sounds wonderful, but leaves the empirical
researcher empty-handed. It would be nice if Brown wrote another book in which he
systematically maps what research and conceptual work still needs to be done for
building a more complete, empirically grounded theory of science-politics
interaction in systems of representative democracy and capitalist economies.
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